I came across a sample argument which allegedly constitutes the foundation of Ayn Rand's Objectivist ethics. I found this argument from a draft of The Logical Structure of Objectivism by William Thomas and David Kelley. However, I find this argument to be a little problematic, casting more doubt in the "philosophy" I've already doubted from the very beginning.
For any living thing, its life is its ultimate value.
A need is a condition the fulfillment of which significantly contributes
to an organism’s ability to preserve itself.
Therefore, anything that satisfies a need, is a value.
This is a very questionable syllogism. First of all, the major premise (For any living thing, its life is its ultimate value), is already false. Simply consider the male praying mantis which is eaten by his mate as soon as they're done mating. Here we have an example of a living thing which does not treat life as its ultimate value.
Still, for the sake of scrutinizing the validity of this argument, suppose the major premise is true. Also, let the second premise be true, although the second premise, by semantic standards, is too simplistic. A battery is needed to make a car run. A car needs a battery to run. This is a valid sentence which properly observed the English syntax. The word "need" isn't limited to living beings. The most general definition of a "need" is as follows:
"a thing that is wanted or required:" (Source: Link)
"A car requires a battery to run" is the same as "a car needs a battery to run." But of course, people might accuse me of being too grumpy, so let's just assume that the premises hold. We now turn our attention to the conclusion.
Therefore, anything that satisfies a need, is a value.
I find at least one problem in this conclusion. What kind of "value" is the "value" at the conclusion? The first premise states that any living being upholds its own life. We can restate that this way: the life of a being is important... a value, to that being. However, the conclusion treats "value" in an absolute sense. Anything that satisfies a need is important... a value.
But what if something that satisfies the need of one, can dissatisfy another? Consider the situation of a man and a dog, about to eat chocolate (assume that the chocolate is dark and is eaten in moderation). For the man and the dog, their respective lives are their ultimate values. Let's consider surviving as a "need," the fulfillment of which significantly contributes to an organism’s ability to preserve itself.
However, chocolates are poisonous to dogs. A chemical in chocolate, theobromine, can be fatal to our canine friends.
If the man eats the chocolate, well, he gets health benefits from it (for proof, here's the link); in the process, he preserves himself; chocolate, then, must be a value, because it satisfied a need; survival.
But this is not the same for the dog. It actually died from eating the chocolate. So what becomes of the chocolate? It helped a living being preserve itself; it satisfied a need, making it a value, but it also ended another's life at the same time, making it a non-value.
How can something be a value and a non-value at the same time? A contradiction like this can only arise if there has been a confusion between relatives and absolutes. The first premise treated "value" in a relative sense, while the conclusion treated "value" in an absolute sense. There has been a shift of meaning; an equivocation, one might say.
Perhaps Objectivists can look into this matter (since Ayn Rand's already dead), but then they might dismiss this point as trivial. I hope that they're right, as I'm about to read more about the so-called logical structure of Objectivism, with fear in my heart that this little logical mess-up might have done more harm than I could have expected.
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